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1On Transmission Grid Governance
Meeting 100% of Europe’s electricity needs through renewable energy by 2050 is possible – if we succeed in pooling the potential of Europe’s renewable 
energy sources. This will require cooperation between the EU member states, as well as coherent policies and regulation at the European level. Both 
currently exist only in fragments, as energy policy in Europe is still shaped mainly at the national level. The Heinrich Böll Foundation therefore asked a 
number of experts to take stock of European policy in the sectors most important for the transition to renewable energy, to identify the areas in which 
European cooperation has been inadequate to date, and to propose possible solutions.
The construction of a European grid is a prerequisite for the joint exploitation of renewable energy sources in Europe. But although the necessity to 
construct such a grid is now widely accepted, the construction of this grid and especially of the interconnectors between the different European countries 
is progressing slowly. In this paper, Antonella Battaglini and Johan Lilliestam explore what could be done – especially on the European level – to speed 
up the construction of a European grid.
By Antonella Battaglini and Johan Lilliestam
A SuperSmart Grid
The potential electricity supply from renewable sources is essentially 
unlimited, seen as an integral over time and vast areas (DLR, 2005; 
2006). However, renewable power has two important characteristics 
that make it different from fossil fuels or nuclear power. First, it 
is not constant and demand-controlled, but ﬂuctuating and supply- 
controlled. This requires us to think about ways to handle these 
ﬂuctuations and adapt the supply and demand curves to each other. 
Second, renewable power has a low energy density and requires vast 
areas of land, which is problematic both due to cost reasons and due 
to land-use conﬂicts. This should cause us to seek and utilize areas 
with as high a renewable energy density as possible, with as limited 
an amount of land-use conﬂict as possible for the electricity supply of 
the future (Luther, 2010; MacKay, 2008). Within the broad ﬁeld of 
renewables, two main approaches to solving these problems exist: the 
decentralized Smartgrid and the centralized Supergrid. 
Up to now, the decentralized, non-utility scale renewables have shoul-
dered the lion’s share of the renewables expansion. Many ecologists 
suggest that a decentralized approach to decarbonizing the electricity 
sector would be efﬁcient as it does not necessitate huge investments 






2inﬂuence and market power of the big utilities. The power system 
would consist of largely independent and energy-autarkic regions, 
each utilizing the renewable resources available in the region. The 
system stability would be ensured through Smart technologies, load 
management and load shifting – for example, triggered by price signals 
– and storage facilities, such as batteries. In times of local abundance, 
electricity would be fed into the regional grid and its storages, and 
in times of scarcity, electricity would be withdrawn (Scheffer, 2008; 
Willenbacher and Hinsch, 2009). However, the overall potentials and 
the availability of good production sites are limited in many regions: 
Some of the densely populated countries in continental Europe may 
not have large enough potentials for 100% renewables (DLR, 2006). 
Furthermore, storage technologies are expensive and the available sites 
are limited (Leonhard et al., 2008). Therefore, a purely de centralized 
European power supply based on autarkic regions or countries may be 
technically possible, but it would be expensive (SRU, 2010).
With increasing maturity, the renewable generators have become 
larger and the energy giants are increasingly stepping into the 
renewab le scene: The large investments in, for example, centralized 
offshore wind farms and concentrating solar power (CSP) installa-
tions ﬁt well into the business proﬁles of the big power companies. 
Accessing areas with high energy densities for power generation, 
such as the North Sea for offshore wind and the Sahara for CSP, will 
lead to lower production costs and a less ﬂuctuating supply (Club of 
Rome, 2008). Constructing a Supergrid – a highly efﬁcient power grid 
(typically high-voltage direct current, HVDC) capable of transpor-
ting electricity over vast distances – would allow for the stochastic 
smoothing of both the demand and the renewable supply, greatly 
reducing the need for expensive storage and backup capacities and 
further reducing the system costs (Czisch, 2005; ECF, 2010; 
ENTSO-E, 2010b). A Supergrid, possibly also with stretches outside 
Europe, is technically possible with existing technologies and is «a 
particularly cheap, but politically extraordinarily demanding» way to 
completely decarbonize the European power sector (SRU, 2010: 66, 
own translation). 
Often, these two approaches are perceived as conﬂicting: The 
decentraliz ed community has accused the centralized community for 
wanting to perpetuate the existing market dominance of the energy 
giants and block the greening of the power sector. On the other hand, 
the centralized community claims that although incremental system 
changes can be done by small actors, the big transformation with its 
massive investments must be done by large, ﬁnancially potent actors, 
and that the key to overall efﬁciency is an efﬁcient transmission grid. 
However, the European power sector must be completely decarbonized 
by 2050 if it wishes to reach its long-term climate obligations of at 
least -80% emissions compared to 1990 (ECF, 2010). This is a stag-
gering task and to achieve this, Europe will need all renewable resour-
ces, regardless of size, location or owner, and it will need to do this 
in as efﬁcient a way as possible. This means that Europe needs both 
a Supergrid and a Smartgrid – a SuperSmart Grid – that integrates 
small-scale and large-scale generation, interconnects regions, coun-
tries and areas of strong centralized and decentralized generation, and 
operate load shift and demand management. 
Building grids
The key to the power system of the future will be a grid allowing for 
both decentralized and centralized generation to be integrated – a Su-
perSmart Grid. As the lifetime of transmission assets spans over many 
decades, the grid of the future is built today. Already today, the need 
for new transmission is massive and growing: In its Ten-Year Network 
Development Plan (TYNDP), the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) reports that the planned 
priority projects – new or refurbished transmission lines of European 
importance – bound for completion by 2020 amount to 42,000 km, of 
which 23,000 are new high-voltage alternating current (HVAC) over-
head lines and 10,000 are new high-voltage direct current (HVDC) 
submarine or underground cables (ENTSO-E, 2010b). This is slight-
ly more than the existing high-voltage grid of Germany. However, 
ENTSO-E and many others warn that already achieving the mid-term 
(2020) transmission targets may be difﬁcult, not to mention the long-
term transformation of the entire power sector, mainly due to regula-
tory and legal aspects. In the following, we will discuss a number of 
key questions, identify the main barriers to a large-scale transmissi-
on grid expansion in Europe and propose solutions to these. We will 
investigate the macroeconomic incentives and the regulation of new 
transmission lines in Europe, as well as the microeconomic incentives 
for the transmission system operators (TSOs) to build new intercon-
nectors. We then investigate the questions of whether a TSO can build 
new lines if it wants to and whether such lines are likely to lead Europe 
onto a ﬁrm path toward a completely renewable power supply.
Why would a TSO want to build new transmission lines? 
Incentives in a national regulatory environment
The base of the different European national regulatory environments 
is a belief in the basic principles of economics: Transmission lines 
that are considered to be proﬁtable and necessary to the country will 
«automatically» be proposed by the TSO to the regulatory authority, 
which will approve them and the lines are constructed. The investment 
costs are recognized by the regulator, which ensures the full recovery 
of these costs, as the capital costs are fully included in the grid-access 
tariffs. The cost recovery is typically calculated on the basis of the 
expected economic lifetime of the line, which stretches over several 
decades. The risk of such an investment is theoretically low – society 
will always need electricity, and thus it will always need to access the 
grid. As a consequence, interest rates and capital costs are assumed 
to be low, leading to – compared to other investments – low rates of 
return for the investor. Often, the return on capital can be as low as 
5 to 6 percent, and the depreciation time may run for up to 50 years 
(De Nooij, 2010; ICF, 2002). If a line is economically inefﬁcient to 
the TSO or to the national system, or not necessary for the country, 
the regulator either denies the application or sets the recovery rate at 
a level that does not allow the TSO to recover the investment costs; in 
this case, the TSO is unlikely to proceed and invest.
One should therefore expect that under this model, all domestic new 
lines that provide economic beneﬁts to the country will be included 
in the national development plan and will be constructed. Moreover, 
all interconnection lines that provide economic beneﬁts to two 
neighboring countries will, in this model, be included in both natio-
nal plans and will be constructed. However, despite this theoretical 
attractiveness of the national regulatory model, Europe currently sees 
much too low transmission investments, also for domestic lines.
In the future, with strongly increasing shares of renewables, which 
is likely to take place where the best resources are, irrespective of 
national borders, the need to ﬂexibly move electricity in different 
directions over long distances and across borders will increase rapidly. 
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However, under the country-wide regulatory model, interconnec-
tion development that provides long-term economic beneﬁts to one 
country but fewer beneﬁts to the neighboring country are unlikely 
to be constructed, and congestion at the border will increase. More-
over, also all internal new lines that provide economic beneﬁts to the 
European system, but not to the concerned country, will not be 
approved nor constructed. The picture below represents the current 
shortages of the national model.
A B C D
In order to expand and integrate renewable energy sources, Country B 
needs to export to A, C or D in case of abundant renewable resources 
in the system. In days with low renewable generation, Country B needs 
to import from Country A. We can expect that the interconnection 
between A and B will be built, as both beneﬁt from it. The intercon-
nection between B and C/D will not be built, as the TSOs in Countries 
C and D would have to bear the costs of lines they do not need. One 
can conclude that under the national regulatory model, a SuperSmart 
Grid will not be constructed. 
Incentives to build merchant interconnector lines
As an alternative, third-party actors – i.e., actors other than the TSO 
with the grid concession – can be exempted from the regulation and 
may be allowed to build cross-border merchant power lines (Regulatio n 
1228/2003, 2003). Today, many interconnectors are built and 
operated under this model, for example Estlink (2006) and the 
planned Italy-Tunisia cable link. Although a merchant line has to be 
approved by the regulator, these interconnector lines do not underlie the 
regulat ed tariff system. Thus, the owner of the merchant line can 
either use the line himself or auction the available capacity to 
interested parties on his own economic conditions. As a consequence, 
the proﬁts – or losses – of a merchant line may be high or low. 
Usually, the investment decisions are made under relatively high 
risk and generally no investments are made unless the estimation for 
recovering the costs is very favorable. Due to the higher risk proﬁle 
of these investments, investors usually expect a recovery time that is 
substantially shorter than the lifetime of the line. Often no more than 
10 years cost-recovery is accepted, which gives considerably higher 
rates of return than what the regulated lines are allowed to achieve. 
The main driver for these investments is the differences in electricity 
price between two countries: Electricity ﬂows from the low-price to 
the high-price market, and the merchant line owner makes his proﬁts 
from this difference. In the future, increasing production of renewables 
in some regions may strengthen the case for merchant cables for two 
reasons. First, attractive support schemes in one country will increase 
the generation, forcing the electricity market prices down. Exploiting 
the price difference and exporting low-price electricity to neighboring 
countries may be the task of merchant lines. Second, some countries 
may choose to fulﬁll their renewable electricity targets by importing 
electricity from their neighbors, and transporting this electricity may 
equally be the task of new merchant lines.
We can therefore expect that some interconnection lines that would 
not be constructed under the national model will be constructed un-
der the merchant line model, if the expected market conditions are 
beneﬁcial. These conditions may be caused by differences between 
national renewables incentive schemes, CO2 emission limits, etc., as 
long as they create electricity price differences between two countries. 
In the situation illustrated below, a merchant line between low-price 
Country B and high-price Country D will be constructed by Country 
C, which makes a proﬁt on the price difference between B and D. The 
producers in Country B proﬁt because they can export their surplus 
electricity, and the consumers in Country D proﬁt because they can 
import lower-price electricity. 
However, in order to maintain the value of the merchant intercon-
nection, a price difference must remain, and thus not all the 
required capacity from Country B to D will be constructed: Costs are 
maintained at a macroeconomically suboptimal – artiﬁcially high – 
level. Under this model, it may be possible to build interconnection 
lines between two European countries and also between a European 
and a non-European country, but the induced capacities are likely to 
be too low to produce system-wide optimal efﬁciencies. Therefore, also 
the merchant line model is not sufﬁcient to deliver a pan-European 
SuperSmart Grid.
Incentives to build interconnections under uncertainty and in vertically-
integrated oligopolies
TSOs earn their money by transmitting electricity and thus have an 
intrinsic interest in transmitting as much electricity as possible. Still, 
too few new transmission lines are being built and there is a large lack 
of interconnectors (European Commission, 2007a). It seems that the 
incentives for TSOs to build new lines and, especially, interconnec-
tors, are insufﬁcient, although «low investment is surprisingly at odds 
with the increased private-sector appetite for investment in long-term 
infrastructure projects» (European Commission, 2007b: 14). This 
lack of willingness to invest in new transmission lines has a number 
of reasons.
First, the TSO cannot be economically punished for not building an 
interconnector and alleviating a congested line. Thus, not building a 
new line preserves the status quo, but does not bring any harm to the 
TSO. Throughout Europe, the interconnector capacity is auctioned or 
allocated in another, non-discriminatory fashion, and this income is 
higher for congested lines. The revenues from the auctioning has to 
be used to either build new interconnector capacity and alleviate the 
congestion, or to lower the general grid-access tariffs in the TSO’s 
grid area (Regulation 1228/2003, 2003: Art. 6(6)). In practice, most 
TSOs choose not to build new interconnectors but to lower the grid 
tariffs: Only some 20 percent of the revenues are used for new inter-
connections (European Commission, 2007a).
Second, most TSOs are not ownership unbundled – only 15 of 41 
are (European Commission, 2009; 2010; Schellekens et al., 2010). 
Although the TSO gets all its income from transmitting electricity, 
a vertically integrated concern – a company that owns both genera-
tion and transmission assets – does not. As the power generation and 
sales sections generally create higher turnovers and proﬁts than the 
transmission section, the concern may be inclined to accept lower 
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4proﬁts in transmission in order to keep competitors out of their 
electricity market, securing the concern’s market power. Vertically 
integrated TSOs thus «have no incentive to develop the network in 
the overall interest of the market with the consequence of facili tating 
new entry at generation or supply level» (European Commi ssion, 
2007a: 4). During the preparations of the new energy legislative 
package, Germany and France – inﬂuenced by the strong ties to their 
former state monopolies, which still totally dominate the national 
power markets – together with a coalition of other Member States 
succeeded in blocking further energy market liberalization measures. 
Due to the resulting power constellation in the European Council, 
the Commission was not able to prevail with its position to force 
vertically integrated companies to sell their transmission asset s. Thus, 
the third energy package will not signiﬁcantly change the existing, 
insufﬁcient unbundling requirements, as it allows ver ti cally inte grated 
companies to keep ownership and re main in con trol of the trans mission 
networks, and therefore in contro l of investments in grid expansion. 
Currently, ther e ar e no sign s that stricter unbundling requirements will 
be implemente d. How ever, although it is clear that unbundling would 
be bene ﬁ cia l, as it would remove the problem of strategically withheld 
in vestments, it is questionable whether unbundling alone would be 
sufﬁcient to trigger more investments in transmission and inter-
connections (see Brunekreeft, 2008). 
Third, the TSO has to perceive new lines as being sufﬁciently pro-
ﬁtable and sufﬁciently risk-less, or they will refrain from investing. 
Transmission capacities need to be constructed based on the antici-
pated development of generation and demand. Transmission assets 
typically stand for several decades, typically much longer than the 
generation assets. Thus, decisions taken when construction starts – 
decisions taken under signiﬁcant uncertainties about the future – have 
a large impact on the future system and the possibilities of this to 
adapt to new situations. These uncertainties have always existed, 
but were magniﬁed by the market opening and the – still imperfect 
– unbundling of generation and transmission in 1999 and are further 
intensiﬁed by the ongoing transformation to a green power system 
(ENTSO-E, 2010b). Obviously, a TSO can expect wind power expan-
sion in windy regions, e.g., in and at the North Sea, and solar power 
expansion in sunny regions, e.g., in Spain. However, the TSO cannot 
know whether this expansion will actually happen, or when it happens. 
Normally, such a situation would trigger higher risk premiums, but this 
is not possible, as the rates of return are regulated in the natural grid 
monopoly. Thus, TSOs need to be risk-averse and, as a consequence, 
may adopt a wait-and-see position and delay their investments, or 
avoid building new lines altogether. Here, there is a clear mismatch 
between the assumption that new transmission is a low-risk endeavor 
(see above) and the current highly uncertain policy environment in the 
European power markets.
Can a TSO build transmission lines if it wants to?
In the current regulation and legal setting, it is difﬁcult and time- 
consuming for a TSO to build a new transmission line. This problem 
has two main components: local, social and political acceptance of 
transmission lines; and long, complex and inefﬁcient permission 
processes.
Most of the lead time of a transmission line project is during the 
auth ori zation phase (ENTSO-E, 2010a; b). On the whole, the per-
mission processes are similar in most Member States: Typically, public 
consultations, an environmental impact assessment, the issuing of a 
building permit and an approval from the regulator are the main steps, 
but the different process phases may be done in different order, in a 
different number of steps or involve different authorities (ENTSO-E, 
2010b). This lack of harmonization and coordination between regu-
lators often leads to massive delays for cross-border projects. In ad-
dition, interconnectors face stronger public opposition than domestic 
lines, as the local population often sees these as mainly serving the 
interests of the big power companies and not the public’s (ENTSO-E, 
2010a). The average time to get a construction permit for a new high-
voltage priority line in Europe is seven years, with 25 percent of the 
projects requiring more than twice that time. At best, the permission 
process can take ﬁve years but some projects have required up to 20 
years. In comparison, the typical construction time of a thermal power 
plant is circa two to three years. This makes transmission investments 
unnecessarily unattractive and risky, and has in many cases even led to 
projects being cancelled (ENTSO-E, 2010b; MVV consulting, 2007; 
Schellekens et al., 2010). Due to lower public opposition, much more 
technically difﬁcult subsea links have been completed much faster 
than many overhead line projects (European Commission, 2007b). All 
in all, the lengthy and uncertain permission processes «endanger the 
timely completion of infrastructure projects and the achievement of 
European policy targets» (ENTSO-E, 2010b:39).
The difﬁculties with social acceptance originate, among other 
things, in an unwillingness of stakeholders to accept and support 
the TSOs’ argumentation of the necessity and use of a new 
transmission line. Often, the local stakeholders do not see how 
the new line, especially cross-border lines, will beneﬁt them. Also, 
the balancing of local environmental damages (e.g., disturbing 
the landscape) on the one side and regional or global environmental 
beneﬁts and economic beneﬁts of resolving a congestion zone on the 
other is difﬁcult. Fears of devaluation of amenities and prosperity, as 
well as perceived health threats, are other important issues leading to 
«not in my backyard» attitudes across the continent. The attempts 
to resolve the interest-balancing problem and increase public accep-
tance from the side of the TSOs have not always been very successful. 
Public opposition is generally lower against lines built by publicly 
owned TSOs, but also in these cases, the resistance can be signiﬁcant 
(ENTSO-E, 2010b; European Commission, 2007b; MVV consulting, 
2007).
Will the investments lead us onto a track to 100 percent renewables  
by 2050?
At the current grid reinforcement and expansion pace, it is unlikely 
that Europe will manage to achieve 100 percent renewable power by 
2050 in an economically acceptable way, mainly due to bottlenecks 
in the grid (SRU, 2010). Thus, the problems described above must be 
addressed and solved. However, it is also not clear whether a national 
regulation based on medium-term economic efﬁciency is compatible 
with a European long-term target.
The integration of remote European, or even non-European, renew-
able power resources and the efﬁcient smoothing of intermittent 
supply require highly efﬁcient, long-distance transmission networks. 
Today, the technology of choice for this would be HVDC, a technology 
that is well-known and widely used in Europe for subsea connections. 
An HVDC grid, or a number of HVDC feeder lines, is probably the 
cheapest way for bulk electricity transfer over vast distances and the 
integration of large amounts of renewable power in the future (Czisch, 
2005; May, 2005). However, HVDC requires DC/AC converters and is 
thus more expensive than HVAC over short distances. The break-even 
point is at about 800 km (DLR, 2006), and not many countries in 
Europe offer stretches of this length, as they are too small. Thus, due 
to the current regulation framework, in essentially all cases it would 
be more proﬁtable for a TSO to build an HVAC line, despite higher 
losses in the long run. Adding new HVAC units remains the easier, and 
probably cheaper, option for TSOs in the short term, but becomes more 
expensive in the long term if an HVDC overlay system ﬁnally needs to 
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regulation and the long-term European objectives may be in conﬂict. 
Furthermore, the renewables action plans are developed in a natio-
nal setting, and the majority of the Member States expect to fulﬁll 
their national 2020 targets alone (DG TREN, 2010). Given the very 
long lifetimes of transmission assets and the long lead times for their 
construction, this may lock the Member States into paths that are less 
than optimal in the longer and geographically broader perspective. 
This may take the form of power line stretches that are nationally 
optimal, but regionally inefﬁcient, for example by ending at a national 
border. It may also be in programmatic form: Some countries may 
decide to go for centralized renewables, like the gigantic wind farms 
in the United Kingdom and Sweden, whereas others may decide for 
a more decentralized solution, like the massive growth in photovol-
taics in Germany, and build grids only capable of handling one type of 
generation. Although there is not necessarily a conﬂict between these 
approaches, the path dependency in the power system requires us to 
acknowledge such potential system conﬂicts now in order to be able to 
avoid problems further on.
Governance for a SuperSmart Grid
The current national regulation and the framework of fragmented 
national energy policies and power markets are unlikely to trigger 
an expansion of the European transmission grids in the necessary 
magnitude. Below, possible solutions to some of the most important 
points are discussed.
Europeanization of regulation, cost recovery and planning
A new regulatory model, designed for Europe and its electricity 
needs of the future, is required to create a European grid capable of 
integrating large amounts of renewable power from both utility-scale 
and decentralized generation while achieving the maximum European 
economic beneﬁt. The aim is to create a pan-European grid, possibly 
including an overlay HVDC grid, the structure of which is deﬁned by 
resource abundance and load areas, not by administrative borders.
First, the regulatory framework must stimulate the construction of 
lines that are beneﬁcial from a European perspective and guarantee 
that the required investments can be fully recovered, regardless of 
national borders. For this, a set of predictable, stable and transpa-
rent mechanisms handling the tariffs on a European level are needed. 
The introduction of a European grid-access tariff could complement, 
or entirely replace, the existing national grid-access tariffs. Such a 
regulatory framework would guarantee cost recovery of international 
lines and reduce the investment risks of new interconnectors, which in 
turn would lower the costs of capital – and the total cost – for such 
investments. To oversee the European regulation and the European 
grid planning, a European regulator and a European planning entity 
will be needed.
Today, we already have the seeds for a new regulatory regime, in the 
form of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). 
In the future, a European Regulatory Authority (ERA) – with a 
European mandate to regulate the union-wide grid expansion in 
support of the renewable and general energy objectives of the EU 
in the short-, medium- and long term – will be required to manage 
the grid regulation on a European level. The ACER could evolve into 
such an entity. The ERA would supervise and approve the permission 
criteria (see section 3.2). It would also be in charge of converting the 
European planning entity’s grid plan proposal (see next paragraph) 
into an operative and legally binding grid development plan and 
implement the European grid-access tariff as deﬁned by policy. 
Additionally, the ERA would be in charge of developing and approving 
compensation toolboxes and procedures to handle public opposition to 
grid infrastructure extension and address the legitimate concerns of 
citizens and communities affected by transmission line construction. 
In addition to the regulatory authority, a planning entity responsible 
for the mid- to long-term transmission grid planning at the European 
level – in line with the long-term objectives of renewable integration 
of the Member States – will be necessary. The ﬁrst steps toward such 
a plan were taken with the ﬁrst TYNDP of the ENTSO-E (ENTSO-E, 
2010b), but it remains to be seen whether this type of planning is 
sufﬁcient or if planning of a more binding nature is required. The 
role for the planning entity, which may remain the ENTSO-E, will 
be to deﬁne the future grid architecture to achieve the maximum 
European economic beneﬁt in the long run and the integration of 
renewable electricity at the level predeﬁned by policy.
The TSOs will still be in charge of constructing the grids, as deﬁned 
in the grid development plans, within the given timetables. They 
will submit investment costs to the ERA, which monitors the cost 
recovery along the lines of a predeﬁned, European remuneration 
model. The TSOs will also be responsible for applying the European 
and national grid-access tariffs to collect the funds to ﬁnance new grid 
developments, and for applying the compensation tool boxes and 
further develop local strategies for dealing with public opposition.
Setting the right incentives: De-risking and unbundling
Investors in many cases see the risks of a new transmission line, 
especially interconnection lines, as being too high for the com-
pensation level. In addition, the vertically integrated TSOs may be 
willing to accept lower turnover to fend off competitors from the other 
divisions of the mother concern. To trigger investments at the appropriate 
levels, the ﬁnancial incentives must be set right. One way of doing 
this is to allow for higher risk premiums, but doing so will create 
higher costs for the European economy. Still, the higher returns are 
one main reason for the construction of merchant lines: Here, the re-
turns are sufﬁciently high to encourage some investment. Another way 
to set more adequate incentives for new-build without increasing the 
immediate costs for consumers is to de-risk the transmission invest-
ment.
De-risking transmission projects may take many forms. A core 
problem of transmission investment is of a chicken-and-egg nature: 
The main uncertainty for new lines is to know whether there are 
customers (loads and/or generators) that will want to be served by 
the line. Conversely, an important risk for generation investment is 
the grid connection, and generators may be reluctant to start building 
before the grid is there. This problem is especially accentuated for 
renewables, as these power stations are often constructed in remote 
areas with only weak or no transmission capacity available. 
Deﬁning areas of European interest for renewable power generation 
would be one way of reducing the uncertainty, and thus the risk, for 
transmission investments. Such increased coordination of generation 
and transmission will make the TSOs much more certain about where 
the generation will take place and roughly when the new capacities will 
be installed, which in turn will help initiate new types of connections 
(i.e., offshore HVDC grids) and new interconnectors by decreasing the 
risk proﬁles of such investments. 
Another way of de-risking transmission investment could be public 
co-funding, which may lead to increased credibility for the project 
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and help mobilize private funds. Such co-funding schemes must be 
transparent and targeted at widely accepted, «good» aims, such as 
integrating renewable electricity, to ensure public acceptance. The 
co-funding can take a number of fundamentally different shapes. 
The ﬁrst option would be a public/private partnership: Here, the risk 
proﬁle of the project is decreased by the presence of a public partner 
who carries a share of the investment costs. The second option would 
instead address the returns of a project and reduce the payback time 
for the investment, still within a regulated assets environment. For 
this option, public co-funding is required to guarantee a regulated 
but higher-than-normal rate of return for investors during the ﬁrst 
years of operation of the transmission lines. A support mechanism 
that guarantees a rate of return between 10 and 12 percent annual-
ly for the ﬁrst three to ﬁve years could be considered. Furthermore, 
concessional loans, marginal cost coverage by public authorities and 
the combination of a number of approaches may come into question: 
It is important that the scheme is adopted to reduce the risk – or in-
crease the rate of return – of transmission projects in support of the 
expansion of renewable electricity in a cost-effective manner for 
European citizens. Finance for public co-funding of transmission pro-
jects could come from a variety of sources, including the EU budget, 
the emission trading revenues, the European Investment Bank and 
different national fund sources, as well as from increased grid tariffs 
or additional levies or fees.
Another source of risk – and a major obstacle for the timely construc-
tion of new lines – are the lengthy and uncertain permission processes 
throughout Europe. First, it is essential to make these processes more 
streamlined and predictable, for example by deﬁning a clear and 
transparent set of criteria that must be fulﬁlled for a transmission 
corridor to be permitted. Any project that fulﬁlls this is – in princi-
ple – eligible for a construction permit, which would limit the possi-
bilities for litigation and very long legal processes. This could both 
fulﬁll the certainty requirements of the investors, and guarantee the 
citizens’ rights. It is crucial that the criteria are set to appropriate-
ly weigh the advantages for the power system and the TSO against 
the disadvantages of the local stakeholders, and that the public 
consultation processes are strengthened. In addition, public know-
ledge about the risks and beneﬁts of transmission lines should be in-
creased. Greater knowledge about the actual health risks and environ-
mental problems of transmission lines is likely to reduce opposition. 
Still, to further reduce the local public resistance and accelerate the 
permission processes, the ERA and the TSOs will likely need to 
consider how the public consultation procedures can be improved and 
how compensation toolboxes for affected citizens can be developed. 
Furthermore, a requirement to ﬁnish the permission process within 
two to three years following the application – with a transparently 
motivated acceptance or denial of the application – could be a sui-
table tool to accelerate the processes to more acceptable levels. All 
these measures will contribute to increasing investor certainty and 
accelerating the permission process, which in turn will be an important 
step toward reducing the investment risks of transmission projects.
Finally, the importance of unbundling must be stressed once more. As 
described in detail above, the issue of transmission grid ownership is 
of crucial importance for setting the incentives for new high-voltage 
lines, and especially interconnectors. With the third energy package, 
the European Union still lacks an ownership unbundling obligation. If 
Europe is serious about truly integrating its electricity markets and 
achieving very high shares of renewables in the power sector, this must 
change: Ownership unbundling remains a key to the electricity supply 
of the future.
Berlin, December 2010
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